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ABSTRACT 
 
Some scholars argue that there are unattractive, unintended side-effects of the ‘quasi-privatizations’ 
that have been associated with New Public Management (NPM). One aspect of this question is the 
international trend towards an increased use of municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) in the deliv-
erance of public services. Since it has been hypothesized that NPM may, for instance, deteriorate 
integrity systems of public organizations, we analyse if the increased use of MOEs is associated with 
heightened corruptions risks. To test this proposition, we focus on a setting that has witnessed a 
burgeoning growth of MOEs the past two decades: Sweden. A local government corruption index is 
employed, developed for each Swedish municipality, and we ask if the drive towards creating, owning 
and operating MOEs correlates with perceived presence of corruption. Our findings indicate that 
such an association is present and that the impact of MOEs indeed is more significant than ‘usual 
suspect’-variables highlighted as important in the corruption literature. Our findings confirm theories 
on the hazards and unintended consequences of ‘quasi-privatization’ and corroborate widespread 
political worries expressed by, for instance, the World Bank, OECD and UNDP on the risks of not 
keeping politicians at arm’s length from the operations of publicly owned enterprises. 
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Introduction 
The literature on corruption has virtually exploded over the past 20 years (e.g. Heywood 2018; Roth-
stein & Varraich 2017). In general, however, its scope has been somewhat narrow. The bulk of the 
literature has traditionally been interested in a) developing or transitional economies, and b) predom-
inantly focus on ‘systemic’ and ‘epidemic’ corruption that c) permeate institutions at the state level. 
In addition to this, as a rule, the measurements employed have been confined to restricted concep-
tions of corruption – giving and taking of bribes.  
Gradually, though, an increasing number of studies have begun to explore corruption in mature de-
mocracies. Often, these analyses have come to highlight the subnational levels (e.g. Broms et al. 2019; 
Grimmelikhuijsen & Snijders 2016; Kristinsson 2015; Charron & Lapuente 2013; Amore & 
Bennedsen 2013; Garcia Quesada et al. 2014; Andersson 2008; Erlingsson et al. 2008). In addition, 
there seems to be a growing acknowledgement that corruption in mature democracies may generally 
take more of the ambiguous ‘grey’ (or ‘sophisticated’) forms and does not predominantly evolve 
around giving and taking of bribes (Erlingsson & Kristinsson 2020; Masters & Graycar 2017; Bergh 
et al. 2016; Papakostas 2012; Girling 1997).1  
As the corruption literature has expanded in this direction, a partly overlapping literature has asked 
whether the introduction of market-inspired reforms – often captured under the umbrella concept 
of New Public Management (NPM) – may have had unintended and unattractive side-effects, such 
as harming public sector’s integrity systems (e.g. Anechiarico & Andersson 2018; Andersson & Er-
lingsson 2012; Andersson 2002). Others have argued that NPM-reforms have simultaneously af-
fected public ethics negatively and deteriorated conditions for public sector accountability (e.g. Bergh 
et al. 2019; Papadoupolos 2007; Aars & Fimreite 2005; Skålén 2004; Kersbergen & Waarden 2004; 
Box et al. 2001; Frederickson 1999; Hondeghem 1998; Lundquist 1998).  
As thought-provoking as this literature is, the literature dealing with the (alleged) unattractive side-
effects of NPM is often theoretical, normative, case-study oriented and/or even outright anecdotal 
(cf. von Maravic & Reichard 2003). A challenging question, then, from a methodological point of 
view, is how scholars should go about to systematically study the hypothesized undesirable side-
                                                     
1 Examples of ‘grey’ or ‘sophisticated’ corruption can range from favoured promotions in public administration as payment 
for loyalty or looking the other way, hiring of friends and relatives to public positions, favoured treatments when civil 
servants give permits or favourable inspections, personal use of public property, but could also be serious (but hard to 
detect) forms such as fraud and embezzlement. For more on the concept of ‘grey’ corruption, see Heidenheimer (1970). 
  
effects of ‘quasi-privatization’ (or ‘middle ground’) which arguably is one of NPM’s principal com-
ponents.  
We propose a novel way to approach this question. We argue that taking a closer look at publicly 
owned enterprises in the form of municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) might be a way forward to 
examine the expectations expressed in this literature. MOEs should be viewed as an integral part of 
NPM, precisely since they are near perfect illustrations of the trend towards ‘quasi-privatization’, or 
‘middle ground’, in public sector reform (Torsteinsen & Bjørnå 2012; Christensen & Lægreid 2003; 
Wettenhall 2001; Thynne 1994). The fact that local governments increasingly have chosen to conduct 
their deliveries of public services through MOEs, has driven scholars to dub this development as a 
burgeoning ‘corporatization’ of local government services (e.g. Andrews et al. 2019; Torsteinsen 
2019; Ferry et al. 2018; Tavares & Camôes 2010; Grossi and Reichard 2008), and go as far as to speak 
of an ‘enterprise fever’ (Aars & Ringkjøb 2011). Regrettably, as Voorn et al. (2017) have pointed out, 
this development has largely been overlooked in the literature.  
The fact that we observe more and more MOEs being created is perhaps unsurprising. MOEs have 
been described as a rational instrument to meet contemporary challenges at the local government 
level caused by austerity (Ferry et al. 2017), and have indeed proven to be somewhat more effective 
than traditional public management in delivering services (Voorn et al. 2017). However, although 
MOEs may have these upsides, a swift and large-scale introduction of MOEs in a country’s entire 
local government sector might come with a price-tag. Oftentimes, scholars associate publicly owned 
enterprises with loss of political control, lessened transparency, worsened conditions for accounta-
bility, and ultimately, increased risks for corruption (Bergh et al. 2019; Torsteinsen & Bjørnå 2012; 
Luke 2010; André 2010; Thomasson 2009). Curiously from this perspective – although primarily 
addressing MOEs in developing nations – the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
has gone so far as to pinpoint MOEs as particularly susceptible to corruption.2  
Considering this, it is necessary to stress that MOEs in no way are a peripheral phenomenon. When 
Dexia Crediop (2004) gathered information about MOEs in Europe, they found that they exist in all 
EU countries except Luxembourg. Sweden is a particularly interesting case to take a closer look at, 
because in Dexia Crediops study, it was the EU country with the second most MOEs per capita. 
                                                     
2 https://corruptionfreecities.org/municipally-owned-enterprises/ 
  
Since that study was conducted, the numbers of Swedish MOEs has continued to grow rapidly, from 
being 1,256 in 2003 to being 1,686 in 2018.  
This rapid development means that MOEs today constitute a significant share of the Swedish local 
government sector. In 2018, 55,000 individuals were employed by MOEs, which translates to roughly 
6 per cent of all employed by local governments. Their total turnover amounted to approximately 
210 billion SEK (4,3% of BNP) and some estimations hold that their net worth amounts to circa 
2,000 billion SEK. In Sweden, MOEs are typically responsible for areas producing different kinds of 
public goods. Over half of them operate with (1) management of social housing, (2) electricity and 
heating, and (3) water and sewer. However, nowadays, almost 40 per cent of them are active within 
miscellaneous areas that have been increasingly hard to categorize. Taking this into account, it is not 
surprising that the Swedish Competition Authority has recurrently criticized MOEs for competing 
with private firms on already established markets (Konkurrensverket 2020; 2014). 
FIGURE 1, (NUMBER OF MOEs IN SWEDEN, 1973–2018) 
 
Against this backdrop, it is worrying from an accountability perspective that The Swedish National 
Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ 2012) found that the number of reported corruption cases in-
volving MOEs has been on the rise. We therefore maintain that Sweden is a well-suited case to take 
closer look in order to fulfil the overarching purpose of the paper: to answer if the ‘quasi-privatiza-
tion’ of the large-scale introduction of MOEs could be associated with higher corruption risks in 
local government. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we initially demonstrate that there are non-trivial 
variations in perceived corruption levels to be explained between Swedish municipalities, and go on 
to introduce the most common explanations to these variations. We end this section by theoretically 
constructing an argument for why MOEs should be expected to be associated with increased suscep-
tibility to corruption. Thereafter, our methodological considerations are introduced by a presentation 
of our data and the methods employed, before proceeding with analyses and main findings. The 
paper concludes with a summary of our results and a discussion about future research avenues, as 
well as about the policy implications of our findings.  
 
Corruption in Social Democratic welfare states: Where to look? 
If we want to know whether MOEs indeed increase local government’s susceptibility to corruption, 
it must first be established that there are any meaningful corruption variations to be explained. After 
demonstrating that this is the case, we survey the existing literature for potential explanations to do 
precisely this. 
From being virtually non-existent before Anderssons (1999, 2002) pioneering studies, there now ex-
ists a handful of corruption studies on corruption in mature, Social Democratic welfare states. Curi-
ously for our purposes, and the case we focus on, there now exists Swedish data on corruption levels 
with the Swedish municipalities as the unit of analysis. Dahlström and Sundell (2013) constructed a 
unique dataset in which they demonstrate that perceived levels of corruption vary in a non-trivial way 
between the Swedish municipalities. With other data sources, noteworthy variations in perceived cor-
ruption levels between municipalities are also reported in Bergh et al. (2017) as well as Erlingsson & 
Wallman Lundåsen (2019). Since Sweden is a relatively egalitarian homogenous country, and regularly 
ranked high when it comes to anti-corruption, rule of law and transparency, the observed within-
country variation is puzzling. It demands explanation, and in this paper, we are interested in what 
role MOEs may play to make the corruption differences between Swedish municipalities intelligible. 
It is worth noting that, as for instance Bergh et al. (2016) as well as Andersson and Erlingsson (2012) 
argue, that when it comes to corruption in highly developed welfare states, it is wise to pay special 
attention to the local government. In such settings, for at least two reasons, local governments are 
expected to be particularly vulnerable to corruption. First, the lion’s share of the welfare-services is 
decentralised to and implemented by local governments (Sellers & Lidström 2007). Second, many of 
  
the responsibilities carried out at the local level have been identified as ‘danger-zones’ for corruption. 
This primarily concerns public procurement, zoning, licensing, granting of permits, supervising and 
inspecting activities, and in addition deciding how certain public resources are to be distributed (e.g. 
grants to support the activities of clubs, organisations and groups) – see similar arguments in, for 
instance, Broms et al. (2019), Andersson & Erlingsson (2012); Huberts et al. (2008) and Fjeldstad 
(2004).    
The premises for the present study, then, is that local governments are subjected to corruption risks, 
and that corruption levels vary between municipalities. In discussions about what could make differ-
ences in corruption levels between subnational units intelligible, several hypotheses have been pro-
posed. For instance, Erlingsson & Wallman Lundåsen (2019) take their cue from the ‘quality of gov-
ernment’-literature (e.g. Rothstein & Teorell 2008) and discuss whether the varying levels of impar-
tiality of local institutions are associated with perceived corruption. Bergh et al. (2017) discuss 
whether the size of municipalities may explain variations, where larger municipalities are expected to 
be more corrupt than small (cf. Rose 2011). Inspired by Goel & Nelson (2011), Bergh et al. (2017) 
maintain that the educational levels of citizens could possibly affect corruption – the hypothesis being 
that the less educated citizens are, the more corruption. The mechanism at work is assumed to be 
that educated citizens are better ‘whistle-blowers’ or ‘watchdogs’ than poorly educated ones. In addi-
tion, and as a complement to education, the presence of local media is assumed to matter – if local 
newspaper editorials are present locally, it is expected to hamper corruption (e.g. Färdigh 2013).  
An additional hypothesis that has flourished in the literature, is that if a politician, political party or a 
coalition of parties hold the same position of power for a long period of time, this may over time 
lead actors to develop corrupt patterns; and conversely, that shifts in political power may be an im-
portant mechanism to prevent corruption (Greene 2007; Lapalombala 1994; Pembel 1990; for a dis-
cussion in the Swedish context see e.g. Andersson 2002). Furthermore, it is also believed that the 
share of women in government has the potential of decreasing corruption levels (Bauhr et al. 2018; 
Dollar et al. 2001).  
In this paper, we want to challenge these notions by introducing an additional independent variable 
that, for various empirical and theoretical reasons, will be of main interest for us – MOEs. Why 
should MOEs be expected to be associated with corruption? The corruption risks associated with 
MOEs in the Swedish context is intimately related to the fact that MOEs are ‘hybrid organizations,’ 
governed simultaneously by public (Kommunallagen) and private law (Aktiebolagslagen). Hence, these 
  
enterprises are embedded in a private sector environment with an a somewhat fuzzy institutional 
logic as well as opportunity structures that are significantly different compared to both traditional 
public administration as well as ‘pure’ private businesses (cf. Thomasson 2009). MOEs are typically 
governed in a network-oriented, ‘business-like’ manner, and – at least, this what was intended in 
theory – at ‘arm’s length’ distance from the political executives of local government.  
However, in Sweden and in practice, local councillors have come to occupy almost all seats on MOE 
boards (SOU 2015:24); the stated reason being to ensure the local governments interest as an owner. 
However, this violates the NPM vision of governing by a ‘arm’s length principle’, and regrettably – 
if we are to believe the arguments developed by both the World Bank (2014) and the OECD (2018) 
– having politicians represented in the boards increases corruption risks. As argued by e.g. the 
UNDP3, allowing councillors to almost exclusively occupy the MOE boards not only increases the 
potential for political interference, it short-circuits the accountability chain and ultimately increases 
the susceptibility of MOE to corruption. 
In addition, it has also been argued that conditions for openness and transparency are worsened in 
MOEs (SOU 2011:43; Erlingsson et al. 2018) and that it can be difficult to audit MOEs (SKL 2013; 
Andersson 2012). Additionally, empirical studies have showed that the awareness of corruption prob-
lems is particularly low among CEOs in MOEs (Statskontoret 2012). Furthermore, it has been shown 
that the governance of MOEs is often associated with a high concentration of power which may 
jeopardize the horizontal check and balances that are intended for such organisations (Bergh et al. 
2019). Taken together, this runs the risk of lowering the probability for corruption scandals to be 
exposed in MOEs. Considering this, and since MOEs have become more frequently used to provide 
public services in what has been deemed to be ‘high-risk sectors’ (e.g. oriented towards local infra-
structure, utility, energy, and transportation), organizations such as the UNDP have maintained that 
we must keep a close eye on MOE, for integrity reasons:  
Compared with private companies, MOEs can face particularly heightened corruption risk owing, 
among others, to underlying issues in their ownership, regulatory and corporate governance arrange-
ments, as well as shortcomings in the quality and credibility of corporate disclosure.4 
                                                     
3 See https://corruptionfreecities.org/municipally-owned-enterprises/ 
4 See https://corruptionfreecities.org/municipally-owned-enterprises/ 
  
Besides from the theoretical risks associated with MOEs described above – risks that have also been 
suggested in the general literature on publicly owned enterprises (e.g. Torsteinsen & Bjørnå 2012; 
André 2010; Thynne 1994) – there are empirical indications which supports the assertation that 
MOEs might be related to corruption. Statistics from Swedish National Council for Crime Preven-
tion shows that the number of reported cases of corruption crimes related to MOEs rose during the 
period 2007-2010 (BRÅ 2012; see also Amnå et al. 2013; Erlingsson et al. 2008). Against this back-
drop, it is then for both theoretical and empirical reasons relevant to formulate and test the theoretical 
propositions and observed anecdotal evidence on large-n data. Hence, below we will test the hypoth-
esis:  
H1: the number of MOEs in a municipality increases corruption levels. 
 
Data and methods 
Our overarching aim is to gauge whether the number of MOEs in a municipality is associated with 
more perceived corruption. This hypothesis – that the propensity to create, own and operate MOEs 
is correlated with corruption – will be tested by cross-sectional regression models, including data 
from all 290 Swedish municipalities.  
To reduce the risk for omitted variable bias or unobserved heterogeneity, we also include a range of 
other variables that have been singled out as important in the literature and assumed to have explan-
atory potential. As suggested in the literature review above, the chosen control variables include mu-
nicipality size, educational levels, media coverage, how long a majority has been in power, as well as 
female representation in local councils. Variable summary and definitions are found in Table 1. We 
discuss the variables in more detail in the subsequent sections. 
  
Presentation of variables  
TABLE 1, (VARIABLE DEFINITIONS) 
No. MOEs Number of enterprises for which the municipality owned at least 50 per cent 
of the shares in 2013.  
Corruption index A municipal-level corruption index based on data from a survey sent to local 
councillors. Corruption is operationalised as offers or acceptance of bribes.   
Local news  
editorials 
A dummy variable for municipalities that have at least on local newspaper with 
an editorial stationed in the municipality.  
Share female rep.  Share of women in the municipal council that were elected in 2010.  
(ln) Pop. Size Log-transformed values of the number of inhabitants in the municipalities in 
2013.   
Educational level Share of municipal population with at least three years university education in 
2013 
Stronghold over  
local power 
Dummy variable for municipalities where one dominating party have held the 
position as mayor during the period 1973–2013.  
 
Dependent variable 
Methodologically approaching the topic of corruption is no easy task, since it involves shady and/or 
illegal actions that involved parties wish to keep hidden. As Jain (2001: 76) points out, we are trying 
to study a phenomenon that by its very nature is ‘difficult to measure since it is carried out … clan-
destinely and away from the public eye and records’. In this paper, we therefore take one of the more 
established – albeit indirect – approaches for corruption measurement. Our dependent variable is an 
attempt to mix experiences and perceptions regarding the occurrence of bribes in public procurement and 
case handling. The index was created by Dahlström and Sundell (2013) and is based on a web survey 
that was sent to 13,361 politicians that were represented in the local council in all of Sweden’s 290 
municipalities in 2012 and 2013. A wide range of questions were included in the survey of which 
questions regarding bribes constituted a part. The overall response rate was 78 per cent. Besides, the 
  
response rate was 50 per cent or more in 288 of the 290 municipalities. The number of respondents 
from each municipality varied between 13 and 68. The average number of respondents was 33.  
All questions related to corruption were asked in relation to the personal experience and local per-
sonal knowledge of the respondents without targeting them regarding their own involvement in cor-
ruption. Respondents were asked questions on whether specific types of corrupt actions had occurred 
in their municipality during the period 2010–2014. To create indices from the pool of potential survey 
questions related to corruption, Dahlström & Sundell (2013) used Principal Component Factor Anal-
ysis (PCA) to identify questions that have a high explanatory value for the same component. An 
additive corruption index was created based on two questions on the occurrence of bribes which 
were found to have high weights for the same component. These questions were whether bribes had 
been offered during a procurement process as well as whether civil servants had received side-pay-
ments to perform duties. The corruption index is thus corresponding to the traditional definition of 
corruption, i.e. ‘abuse of public office for private gain’ (e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1978). The questions 
had a scale on the range from 1 to 7, where 7 corresponds to the highest frequency of corruption.  
The additive index was created and measured as the mean values for the two questions for all re-
spondents in individual municipalities.5 Dahlström and Sundell (2013) have performed external vali-
dation of their index, and it supported a correlation between the corruption index and three other 
corruption indicators: newspaper articles about bribery, bribery charges and another corruption index 
that also was based on a web survey.  
Independent variables 
No. of MOEs: 
Data on our main independent variable – MOEs – was provided by Statistics Sweden and covers all 
290 municipalities. This dataset only contained MOEs that were owned to 50 per cent or more by 
the municipalities. In 2006, nine of ten MOEs were majority-owned by the municipality, according 
to Hansson (2006). This indicates that the lion’s share of all MOEs are included in our dataset.  
  
                                                     
5 More information about the survey and the index can be found in Dahlström and Sundell (2013) and Karlsson and 
Gilljam (2014). 
  
(ln) Population size: 
According to previous studies, population size is expected to positively correlate with corruption. 
The rationality of this assumption is that a corrupt action will affect each citizen less when committed 
in larger populations, compared to smaller populations. Consequently, this lowers the barrier of com-
mitting corrupt actions (Rose 2011). Furthermore, it is also expected to be more difficult to audit the 
relatively large number of politicians in bigger municipalities, and hence it is easier to avoid detection. 
In addition, it is critical to control for whether larger municipalities are associated with more MOEs 
to avoid spurious results. For this study, data of the municipalities’ population size was provided by 
Statistics Sweden. This data was from the third quarter of 2013 and covered all 290 municipalities. 
As explained in detail in the descriptive section, we use log-transformed values of population size to 
account for skewness in the distribution.   
Educational level: 
Some studies have shown that higher educational levels tend to reduce corruption. An important 
mechanism assumed to be at work, is that a well-educated population is more prone to discover 
corrupt actions committed in public organizations – and then hold them accountable (Goel & Nelson 
2011). In this study, educational level is operationalised as the share of municipal population (over 
the age of 16) with at least three years university education. Once again, the data was provided by 
Statistics Sweden and covers all 290 municipalities. 
Media coverage (local editorials): 
The presence of media is typically expected to prevent corruption (Färdigh 2013). In line with this 
expectation, studies have shown that local corruption scandals in Sweden are often exposed by local 
investigative journalists (BRÅ 2013). We operationalise local media coverage as a dummy for munic-
ipalities that at least have 1 local editorial and the variable covers all 290 municipalities. A dummy is 
chosen for number of editorials since we make the assumption that the association is most likely not 
linear and that the number of editorials would rather reflect municipality size rather than the intensity 
of scrutinization. The data was collected and provided by Bergh et al. (2017). 
Stronghold over local power: 
Some researchers have discussed that stronghold over local power might correlate with higher cor-
ruption. The mechanisms at work are assumed to be numerous. For instance, the parties in power 
  
can be expected to treat the municipality and its resources as something that they ‘own’, affecting 
everything from public position recruitment to public procurement, and also, it is expected to reduce 
the incentives for the political opposition to audit the local government if they realistically cannot 
hope to hold the political power in a foreseeable future (e.g. Andersson 2002). Stronghold of local 
power is in the study operationalised as a dummy variable for municipalities where one party has 
withheld the position as mayor for 40 years (1973-2013). The data is based on an article from Dagens 
Samhälle (30/ 10/ 2013)6 on 69 municipalities that in 2013 had not experienced a political shift of 
power for 40 years. 
Share of female representatives in council: 
The share of women in government is believed to decrease corruption levels (Bauhr et al. 2018; 
Dollar et al. 2001). The data on share of female representation in the municipal council is from Sta-
tistics Sweden and covers all 290 municipalities.    
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows basic descriptive statistics over the variables that are included in the analyses. Among 
other things, it demonstrates that the perceived corruption levels vary between 1.04 –3.545, with the 
average value of 1.661 (on a scale that ranges between 1-7). The table also shows that the variation 
in MOE-ownership is quite significant: from 0 MOEs to 71. At the point of measurement, a munic-
ipality owned and operated on average 5.73 MOEs. The distribution of population size is highly 
skewed including many small and medium sized municipalities in the range of 10,000 to 50,000 in-
habitants and a few larger cities with several hundred thousand inhabitants. We will use log-trans-
formed values of population size in our estimations. This give us a variable that is symmetric and 
closer to normal distribution.  
  
                                                     
6 https://www.dagenssamhalle.se/nyhet/haer-har-makten-cementerats-6696  
  
TABLE 2, (DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION ON THE RELEVANT VARIABLES) 
 N Min. Max. Average St. dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Corruption index 290 1.05 3.55 1.66 0.38 1.55 7.64 
No. MOEs 290 0 71 5.73 7.12 4.80 36.46 
Share female rep. 
in council 
290 30        53 42.23 4.33 -0.19 2.95 
Pop. Size 290 2,436 897,700 33,258 68,230 8.81 100.77 
Share with  
university educ. 
290 0.06         0.44 0.14 0.06 1.96 7.86 
Local editorial 290 0 1 0.56      0.50 - - 
Stronghold over 
local power 
290 0 1 0.24 0.43 - - 
N 290       
 
Results 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we will only look at the association between MOEs and 
perceived corruption. Second, we will attempt to wash any spurious effects/associations away by 
estimating multivariable regressions with competing explanatory variables.  
Figure 2 shows scatter plots between the number of MOEs and the corruption index. Figure 2a 
includes all municipalities. First, it is worth noting that there is a non-trivial variation in corruption 
levels that cannot be explained by the number of MOEs: most municipalities have between 0-10 
MOEs, and there is variation in perceived corruption between these municipalities. No trend is indi-
cated when only these municipalities are studied in isolation.  
  
  
FIGURE 2A, (MOEs AND CORRUPTION, ALL OBSERVATIONS)  
 
FIGURE 2B, (MOEs AND CORRUPTION, WITHOUT CORR. OUTLIERS) 
 
FIGURE 2C, (MOEs AND CORRUPTION, WITHOUT MOE OUTLIERS)  
 
  
However, there is a slight upward trend in the entire data set. From the scatterplot, it is evident that 
municipalities with more than ten MOEs are generally associated with more perceived corruption. 
Nevertheless, there are few municipalities with 20 or more MOEs. This could make the regression 
line sensitive to outliers. As a robustness check, the four most extreme outliers regarding corruption 
are excluded from Figure 2b. The slope is noticeably flatter. Nonetheless, a correlation is nonetheless 
still indicated: the number of MOEs is still a reasonably good predictor of more perceived corruption.  
Finally, the most extreme outliers regarding ownership of enterprises – the cities of Stockholm and 
Gothenburg – are excluded from the scatterplot in Figure 2c. The slope of the third regression line 
is similar to the slope in the first plot since both Stockholm and Gothenburg fitted well into the 
overall trend. Overall, it can be concluded that our scatterplots indicate a small but noticeable corre-
lation between the number of MOEs and the index used to gauge corruption. We will explore this 
relationship further in regression models that include other relevant variables. 
Table 3 shows regressions over the association between the number of MOEs and the levels of 
corruption. In the first model, we demonstrate the correlation between the number of MOEs and 
our corruption measure in all 290 municipalities. In line with the initial assumption, there is indeed a 
significant association between MOEs and levels corruption: the more MOEs a municipality oper-
ates, the more perceived corruption. According to this correlation, one more MOE is predicted to 
increase the corruption level with 0.021 corruption index units. Admittedly it is small, but nonetheless 
it is a noticeable increase. The first model also tells us that MOEs seem to be able to account for 
approximately 15 per cent of the variation in perceived corruption. Again, not too impressive, but 
nevertheless, MOEs do seem to pick up something of relevance.  
In Model 2, we have removed four outliers – the four municipalities that have extreme values, i.e. 
high corruption levels, and hence run the risk of skewing the overall impression. When these are 
removed from the analysis, the effect is still there, although somewhat weaker: one additional MOE 
is predicted to increase corruption levels with 0.015 Corruption index units. In addition, the coeffi-
cient of determination drops drastically from 0.147 to 0.080 between Model 1 and Model 2. This 
change is mainly caused by the exclusion of Gothenburg which is an extreme outlier both regarding 
the number of MOEs and the occurrences of bribes. Despite these extreme values, the corruption 
index of Gothenburg is close to the regression line thus increases the explained variance of the model.  
In Model 3, we have removed extreme values regarding our main independent variable– i.e. Gothen-
burg that operates 71 enterprises and Stockholm that operates 57. As with Model 1 and 2, we still 
  
end up with a statistically significant association between the number of MOEs and their levels of 
corruption. We can therefore, somewhat confidently, conclude that certain outliers do not drive the 
connection between MOEs and corruption. The existence of even some few extra MOEs is associ-
ated with higher corruption levels. This, in itself, is an interesting observation and – if nothing else – 
a thought-provoking descriptive contribution to the literature on MOEs, accountability and corrup-
tion-risks in the wake of NPM-reforms.  
TABLE 3, (ASSOCIATION BETWEEN LEVEL OF CORRUPTION (DEP) AND NUMBER OF MOEs (IND) 
 Model 1 
Bivariate model 
all observations 
Model 2 
Bivariate model 
without corr.-outliers 
Model 3 
Bivariate model 
without MOE-outliers 
No. MOEs  0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
Intercept 1.543*** 
(0.027) 
1.553*** 
(0.025) 
1.542*** 
(0.030) 
R2 (adjusted) 0.147 0.078 0.084 
N 290 286 288 
Unstandardized coefficients; standard deviations within parentheses. Significance: *p< 0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.   
Let us now introduce more variables and challenge our assumption with competing explanations, to 
see if the associations observed above still hold. In Table 4, all additional variables pinpointed to be 
of interest are present. According to the theoretical expectations presented earlier, number of MOEs, 
population size and whether or not the same party has been in power for a prolonged period, is 
assumed to be positively related to the corruption levels of municipalities, i.e. the higher values on 
these independent variables, the higher the corruption levels. Conversely, the higher the levels of 
education, the more newspaper editorials are present, and the more women there are in council, the 
lower corruption levels we expect to observe. 
First, then, in Model 4, we limit ourselves to only look at MOEs and log of population size, and their 
relation to corruption levels. This is so, because we want to assure ourselves and check the possibility 
whether higher population size is associated with more MOEs; hence, that the results in Table 3 are 
  
spurious, i.e. that the association between MOEs and corruption may in fact be driven by municipal 
size. However, as Model 4 tells us, the introduction of population size does not eradicate the associ-
ation between MOEs and corruption – although it weakens somewhat. At the same time, there is 
also a significant association between population size and corruption. Ultimately, Model 4 suggests 
that the introduction of population size does not affect the association between MOEs and corrup-
tion levels. 
Let us then move to Model 5, where all variables are included. Interestingly, for population size, 
educational levels, media coverage and female representation, no statistically significant associations 
are observed. And surprisingly – contrary to theoretical expectations – a prolonged stronghold over 
the mayor-position in a municipality by the one and same party tends to lower corruption levels.7  
Finally, we conduct two robustness tests on the full model, excluding outliers in the dependent and 
the independent variable. In Model 6, we exclude the municipalities with the four most extreme 
values of the corruption index while including all control variables. The exclusion of these outliers 
leads to a drop in both coefficient value (from 0.014 to 0.008) and adjusted R-square (from 0.194 to 
0.120). However, the effect of MOEs remains significant in Model 6.  
In Model 7, we conduct a second robustness test by estimating a model with all control variables but 
excluding Stockholm and Gothenburg, which are outliers with regard to the number of MOEs. This 
exclusion only leads to a small drop in the coefficient value for the number of MOEs compared to 
Model 5, which included all observations. In addition, the number of MOEs is still significant telling 
us that the previous findings were not dependent on the influence of the large cities of Stockholm 
and Gothenburg. Although the adjusted R-square drops from 0.194 in Model 5 to 0.138 in Model 7 
confirming that the two largest metropolitans account for a large share of the variation in the data 
and that their observations fit well with the predictions in Model 5.  
As a final robustness check, we estimated Model 4-7 with MOEs per capita (defined as the number 
of MOEs per 10,000 inhabitants) as an independent variable. These models are included in the ap-
pendix and are in all relevant aspects similar to the findings in Table 4. More MOEs per capita are 
associated with higher corruption levels in all models, and these relationships are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 per cent level. 
                                                     
7 This is in line with findings reported by Bergh et al. (2017) as well as Rådenmark (2016).    
  
TABLE 4, (WHAT EXPLAINS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION LEVELS?) 
 Model 4 
With population 
Model 5 
Full model 
Model 6 
Full model without  
corruption outliers 
Model 7 
Full model without   
MOE-outliers 
No. MOEs  0.013*** 
(0.004) 
 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 0.008** 
(0.004) 
 0.012** 
(0.005) 
(ln) Population size  0.082***  
(0.029) 
0.051 
(0.035) 
 0.062* 
(0.032) 
 0.060 
(0.037) 
Share with univer-
sity educ. 
  0.069 
(0.459) 
-0.316 
(0.416) 
 0.056 
(0.463) 
Local editorial  -0.072 
(0.044) 
-0.058 
(0.039) 
-0.071 
(0.044) 
Female rep. in  
council 
 -0.007 
(0.005) 
 0.005 
(0.004) 
 0.007 
(0.005) 
Stronghold over 
power in council 
 -0.145*** 
(0.048) 
-0.126***  
(0.043) 
-0.144*** 
(0.048) 
Intercept  0.784*** 
(0.268) 
 0.833*** 
(0.357) 
 0.883*** 
(0.323) 
 0.758** 
(0.366) 
N 290 290 286 288 
R2 (adjusted) 0.167 0.194 0.120 0.138 
Unstandardized coefficients; standard deviations within parentheses. Significance: *p< 0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
In sum, what still stands the test – despite different model specifications and robustness checks – is 
the effect the number of MOEs has on corruption. Ultimately, then, the number of MOEs do seem 
to make some of the variation in corruption levels intelligible – a result which also was found in 
Dahlström and Sundell (2014). However, there is still much unexplained variation that calls for fur-
ther research.  
  
 
Conclusions 
It is well-established that corruption has a wide range of societally undesirable consequences. It harms 
vertical as well as horizontal trust, hampers economic development, and is detrimental for the well-
being of individuals from a whole range of aspects (cf. Holmberg et al. 2009). This is as true for 
developing as it is for developed countries. If the issue of corruption is taken seriously also in low-
corruption settings such as Sweden, it is undeniably an important task to identify the causes of cor-
ruption in these contexts as well, not least to be able to nip irregular practices in the bud in countries 
that historically have been relatively spared from corruption. If not, as indicated by, for instance, 
Bardhan (1997), downward spirals can quickly be set off even in countries hailed as ‘clean and honest’.  
This paper has discussed the alleged risks of one aspect of ‘quasi-privatization’ which has followed 
in the wake of NPM: the increased use of MOEs in the provision of public services, a trend that has 
been observed across the globe. Publicly owned enterprises, like MOEs, have been singled out as a 
danger-zone for corruption by several scholars. Theoretically, there are at least four reasons to be 
wary towards MOEs. 
 First, they have become increasingly used to provide public services in what has been 
highlighted as ‘high-risk sectors’: they are involved in zoning, construction projects, op-
erate power and water distribution, as well as transportation. In addition, they are fre-
quently employed in high economic output areas.  
 Second, as argued by the World Bank (2014), OECD (2018) and UNDP, in situations 
where representatives of the ‘owners’ (in our case, the councillors) and the boards of 
MOEs overlap to a large extent, the risk of political interference is omnipresent and such 
overlaps may also constitute a short-circuit of the accountability chain. This, in turn, 
make MOEs susceptible to corruption.  
 Third, scholars have associated MOEs with lower transparency and as ‘hybrid organiza-
tions’ they blur boundaries between the public and the private spheres, which tends to 
make rules and norms fuzzy for decision makers, ultimately hampering traditional ac-
countability mechanisms (e.g. Grossi & Thomasson 2015).  
 Fourth, and importantly, the boards of MOEs have been notorious for not including 
women, only having approximately 20–25 per cent female representatives present (Wide 
2020). Since a consistent finding is an association between the share of females in elected 
  
office and the level of corruption, the low share of women present in MOE boards is 
an obvious warning signal (e.g. Bauhr et al. 2018).  
What we have aimed at doing here, is to engage with the literature that maintains that there may be 
detrimental and unintended side-effects of the ‘quasi-privatization’ associated with NPM and test the 
hypothesis if the number of MOEs is associated with more perceived corruption. Although the ex-
plained variance is not impressive, the hypothesis was confirmed despite the addition of several com-
peting explanations into our models. The more MOEs a municipality operates, the risks for corrup-
tion tend to be alleviated.  
All in all, we maintain that the paper constitutes a novel empirical contribution to the literature on 
the hypothesised unattractive side-effects of ‘quasi-privatisations’ and NPM; a tradition that to a large 
extent has either been purely theoretical, normatively argumentative or case-study oriented. Our study 
is cross-sectional, and hence, we cannot make claims to causality. That said, having being able to 
demonstrate that recurring and plausible theoretical arguments – and indeed political and practical 
worries – find support in a large-n study, lends credibility to the argument that the growing sector of 
‘hybrid organisations’ operating in the intersection between the public and the private sphere seem 
to be associated with increased moral hazards and heightened corruption risks.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1, (MOEs PER CAPITA AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION LEVELS) 
 
 Model 8 
With population 
Model 9 
Full model 
Model 10 
Full model  
without  
corr.-outliers 
Model 11 
Full model 
without   
MOE-outliers 
MOEs per capita  0.031*** 
(0.012) 
 0.034*** 
(0.012) 
 0.028*** 
(0.010) 
 0.031*** 
(0.011) 
(ln) Population size  0.179*** 
(0.024) 
 0.155*** 
(0.030) 
 0.125*** 
(0.027) 
 0.137***  
(0.030) 
Share with  
university educ. 
  0.039 
(0.463) 
-0.270 
(0.414) 
 0.041 
(0.458) 
Local editorial  -0.066 
(0.044) 
-0.053 
(0.039) 
-0.067 
(0.044) 
Female rep in council   0.008* 
(0.005) 
 0.006 
(0.004) 
 0.008* 
(0.005) 
Stronghold over 
power in council 
 -0.149*** 
(0.049) 
-0.129*** 
(0.043) 
-0.146***   
(0.048) 
Intercept -0.179 
(0.256) 
-0.242 
(0.338) 
 0.191 
(0.302) 
-0.048 
(0.344) 
N 290 290 286 288 
R2 (adjusted) 0.154 0.181 0.130 0.146 
MOEs per capita are defined as the number of majority owned enterprises per 10,000 inhabitants.  Unstandardized coefficients; 
standard deviations within parentheses. Significance: *p< 0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.   
